Life and main writings of Kant

The Life and main Writtings of Kant

Kant’s philosophy is generally designated as a system of transcendental criticism tending towards agnosticism in theology, and favouring the view that Christianity is a non-dogmatic religion.

Immanuel Kant was born at Konigsberg in East Prussia, 22 April, 1724; died there, 12 February, 1804. From his sixteenth to his twenty-first year, he studied at the university of his native city, having for his teacher Martin Knutzen, under whom he acquired a knowledge of the philosophy of Wolff and of Newton’s physics. After the death of his father in 1746 he spent nine years as tutor in various families. In 1755 he returned to Konigsberg, and there he spent the remainder of his life. From 1755 to 1770 he was Privatdozent (unsalaried professor) at the University of Konigsberg. In 1770 he was appointed professor of philosophy, a position which he held until 1797.

It is usual to distinguish two periods of Kant’s literary activity. The first, the pre-critical period, extends from 1747 to 1781, the date of the epoch-making “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”; the second, the critical period, extends from 1781 to 1794.

The Pre-Critical Period

Kant’s first book, which was published in 1747, was entitled “Gedanken von der wahren Schatzung der lebendigen Krδfte” (Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces). In 1775 he published his doctor’s dissertation, “On Fire” (De Igne), and the work “Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio” (A New Explanation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge), by which he qualified for the position of Privatdozent. Besides these, in which he expounded and defended the current philosophy of Wolff, he published other treatises in which he applied that philosophy to problems of mathematics and physics. In 1770 appeared the work “De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Formis et Principiis” (On the Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World), in which he shows for the first time a tendency to adopt an independent system of philosophy. The years from 1770 to 1780 were spent, as Kant himself tells us, in the preparation of the “Critique of Pure Reason”.

The Critical Period

The first work of Kant in which he appears as an exponent of transcendental criticism is the “Critique of Pure Reason” (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), which appeared in 1781. A second edition was published in 1787. In 1785 appeared the “Foundation for the Metaphysics of Ethics” (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten). Then came a succession of critical works, the most important of which are the “Critique of Practical Reason” (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)[1], the “Critique of Judgment” (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1790), and “Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793).

A brief Presentation of Kant’s Philosophy

During the period of his academic career, extending from 1747 to 1781, Kant, as has been said, taught the philosophy then prevalent in Germany, which was Wolff’s modified form of dogmatic rationalism. That is to say, he made psychological experience to be the basis of all metaphysical truth, rejected skepticism, and judged all knowledge by means of reason. Towards the end of that period, however, he began to question the solidity of the psychological basis of metaphysics, and ended up losing all faith in the validity and value of metaphysical reasoning.

The apparent contradictions which he found to exist in the physical sciences, and the conclusions which Hume had reached in his analysis of the principle of causation, made Kant conscious of his thus far adopted philosophical dogmatism and created in him the necessity of reviewing or criticizing all human experience for the purpose of restoring the physical sciences to a degree of certitude which he believed they rightly claim, and also for the purpose of placing on an unshakable foundation the metaphysical truths which Hume’s skeptical phenomenalism had overthrown. Kant now clearly saw, that the old rational dogmatism had laid too much stress on the “a priori” elements of knowledge; on the other hand, as he now for the first time realized, the empirical philosophy of Hume had gone too far when it reduced all truth to empirical or “a posteriori” elements.

Kant, therefore, sets off to critically review all previous knowledge in order to determine how much of it is to be assigned to the “a priori”, and how much to the “a posteriori” attributions, if I may so designate them, of knowledge. As he himself says, his purpose is to deduce the “a priori” or transcendental, forms of thought. Hence, his philosophy can be characterized as being essentially “critical”, because it is an examination of knowledge, and “transcendental”, because its purpose in examining knowledge is to determine the “a priori”, or transcendental, forms of thought.

Kant himself was eager to say that the ultimate purpose of philosophy is to answer three questions:

·What can I know?

·What ought I to do?

·What may I hope for?

He considered, however, that the answer to the second and third depends on the answer to the first; our duty and our destiny can be determined only after a thorough study of human knowledge[2].

Kant’s critical philosophy may be divided into three portions, corresponding to the doctrines contained in his three “Critiques”. In his “Critique of Practical Reason”, that I shall now discuss, the doctrine of the “Categorical Imperative” is of central importance.

“Critique of Practical Reason”

Kant, it has often been said, became a master of demolition before mastering the art of building. What he took away in the first “Critique” he returned “new and improved” in the second. In the “Critique of Pure Reason” he showed that the truths which have always been considered the most important in the whole range of human knowledge have no foundation in metaphysical, that is, purely speculative, reasoning. In the “Critique of Practical Reasoning” on the other hand, he aims at showing that these truths rest on a solid moral basis, and are thus placed above all speculative contention and the clamour of metaphysical dispute. He thus overthrows the imposing edifice which Cartesian dogmatism had built on the philosophical foundation of the “Cogito”; he now sets about the task of stressing the indisputable truth expressed and at the same time demanded by some kind of naturally imposed moral necessity or obligation.

The moral law is supreme:

·It is superior to any deliverance of the purely speculative consciousness; He characteristically writes at some point that: I am more certain that “I ought” than I am that “I am glad”, “I am cold”, etc.

·It is superior to any consideration of interest, pleasure or happiness; Specifically Kant believed that one can forego what is in his/her interest, can set other considerations above pleasure and happiness, but if his/her conscience testifies that something “ought” to be done, then nothing can overturn or block the dictates of conscience, though, of course, one is free to obey or disobey them.

Kant’s moral law (or conscience)[3] , then, is the one unshakable foundation of all moral, spiritual, and higher intellectual truth. One peculiarity of the moral law is that it is rendered universal and necessary application. When conscience declares that something is wrong, the imposed verdict is not merely intended for here and now, it is not meant for “just this once”, but bears a spatiotemporal coherence and therefore becomes a “de facto” standard of universal application and validity.

This quality of universality and necessity shows at once that the moral law has no foundation in pleasure, happiness, the perfection of self, or a so-called moral sense[4]. It is its own foundation. It interacts with conscience immediately, commands unconditionally, and need give no reason for what it asks. It demands unconditional, and in a sense unreasoned obedience[5].

So, the moral law is a command (imperative), not a form of advice or invitation; and it is an unconditional (categorical) command, not a command in the hypothetical mood[6]. One should not overlook the peculiar character of the categorical imperative; Only in its most universal utterances does it possess those qualities which render it unique in human experience, but as soon as the contingent data, or contents of a specific moral precept, are presented to it, it imposes its universality and necessity on them and lifts them to its own level. The contents may have been good, but they could not have been absolutely good; for nothing is absolutely good except good will[7].

The moral law is known not by inference, but by immediate intuition. This intuition is, as it were, the primum philosophicum. It takes the place of Descartes’ “first-person priviledge”, and bears the convincing power of his “ipso facto” known “clear and distinct ideas” . Consequently, all the important questions of philosophy are deductively answered through it. Mainly those are: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God).

The freedom of the will follows from the existence of the moral law, because the fact that “I ought” implies the contigency of human conduct[8]. One intuitively knows that he/she ought to do a certain thing, and from this it is infered that he/she can. In the order of the “normally” perceived sequence of life’s events, of course, freedom precedes obligation. In the order construed by Kant’s epistemological claims, freedom is infered from the fact of obligation.

Similarly, the immortality of the soul is implied in the moral law. The moral law demands complete fulfilment of itself thus aiming at absolute human perfection. Now, the highest perfection that man can attain in this life is only partial or incomplete perfection, because, as long as the soul is united with the body, there is always in our nature a mixture of the corporeal with the spiritual (or incorporeal if you will)[9]; the striving towards holiness is accompanied by an inclination towards unholiness, and virtue implies a Heraclitean struggle or strife between two opposing forces that act as the shaping factros of human morality[10]. This whole ordeal, therefore, makes it a contigent certainty that there must be a life after physical death (whatever that notion means) in which this “endless progress” towards perfection[11], as Kant calls it, will be continued.

Finally, the moral law implies the existence of God. And it does so in two ways: The authoritative “voice” of the moral law implies a supreme lawgiver. Moreover, the nature of the moral law implies that there must be somewhere a good which is not only supreme, but complete, and which embodies in its perfect holiness all the conditions which the moral law implies. This supreme good, according to Kant, is God[12].

Evaluation of Kant

Critics and historians are not all agreed as to Kant’s rank among philosophers. Some rate his contributions to philosophy so highly that they consider his doctrines to be the culmination of all that went before him. Others, on the contrary, consider that he made a false start when he assumed in his criticism of speculative reason that whatever is universal and necessary in our knowledge must come from the mind itself, and not from the world of reality outside us. These opponents of Kant consider, moreover, that while he possessed the synthetic talent which enabled him to build up a complete system of thought, he was lacking in the analytic quality by which the philosopher is able to observe what actually takes place in the mind; a claim that of course, if true, would be of catalytic consequences for the whole philosophical system presented by a thinker who reduced all philosophy to an epistemological “safari”.

Whatever may be our evaluation of Kant as a philosopher, we should not underestimate his importance. From a historical point of view, his thought was the stepping-stone for Fichte. Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and of course Nietchsze; and, so far as contemporary philosophic thought in Germany is concerned, whatever of it is not Kantian takes up its distinguishing characteristics by its opposition to some Kantian doctrine. In England the Agnostic School from Hamilton to Spencer drew its inspiration from the negative criticism on the “Critique of Pure Reason”. In France the Positivism of Comte and the neo-Criticism of Renouvier had a similar origin.

Also, Kant’s influence reached out, beyond the general realm of philosophy, into various other departments of thought. In the history of the natural sciences his name is associated with that of Laplace, in the theory which accounts for the origin of the universe by a natural evolution from a “primitive cosmic nebula”. In theology, Kant’s non-dogmatic notion of religion influenced Ritschl, and finally his method of transforming dogmatic truth into moral inspiration finds an echo, to say the least, in the exegetical experiments of Renan and his followers.

Some philosophers and theologians have held that the objective data on which the Catholic religion is based are incapable of proof by means of speculative reason, but are demonstrable by practical reason, will, sentiment, or vital action. That this position is, however, potentially dangerous, is proved by recent events: The Immanentist movement, the Vitalism of Blondel, the anti-Scholasticism of the “Annales de philosophie chretienne”, and other recent tendencies towards a non-intellectual apologetic of the Faith, have their roots in “Kantism”, and the condemnation they have received from ecclesiastical authority shows plainly that they have no clear title to be considered a substitute for the intellectualistic apologetic which has for its ground the realism of the Scholastics. It is thus true that a Kantian, in character, quest for the proof of existence of God will not neessarily lead to the exposition of a God that would be acceptable by official ecclesiastical or religious, in general, authority. (From the Catholic Encyclopedia, copyright © 1913).

[1] In which, his doctrine of the “Categorical Imperative” is presented.

[2] It is thus fair to say that epistemology is of grave importance in the philosophy of Kant.

[3] One can easily see here the general similarity that Kant’s moral law bears with Butler’s account of conscience.

[5] One could commend here, that in a sense Kant’s moral law is seated on “a Royal Throne” inside the human mind.

[6] The Categorical Imperative speaks of unshakable necessities and not of contingent or conditional requests.

[7] The acceptance, that is, of the moral law.

[8] One can do what the moral law demands but finally he/she will or will not do it.

[9] We can see here a clear Platonic influence on Kant.

[10] The eternal battle between “Good” and “Evil”; here presented in a depictevely obsure but philosophically clear and well founded way.

[11] This endless human strife towards perfection is a constantly recurring theme (and in most cases presumed truth) of almost all philosophical systems, ancient and modern.

[12] Here, more than anywhere, one can notice the profound influence that Platonic idealism had on Kant. The platonic “theory of forms” also allows as the highest and all embodying form that of “Goodness”, which also represents the perfection sought by the moral conduct of each man in his way of transcendance from the bastard existence of body/form to pure form and finally the “unhypothetical first beginning”.